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a b s t r a c t
In thepresentpaperwestudyvoting-basedcorporate control inageneral equilibriummodel
with incomplete ﬁnancial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting,
super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic
setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings)
can give rise to – through self-fulﬁlling expectations – dramatical political instability, i.e.
Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In general equilibriummodelswith production and incomplete ﬁnancialmarkets, agents (consumers/shareholders) trade
assets, but at the market equilibrium, their gradients are typically not collinear: they disagree on the way to evaluate income
streams outside the market span. Hence proﬁt maximization is not a well deﬁned objective for ﬁrms.2
A way to resolve these disputes between shareholders is based on majority voting in assemblies of shareholders.3 Among
others Drèze (1985) and DeMarzo (1993) propose the same concept of majority-stable equilibria: within each ﬁrm, the pro-
duction plans of other ﬁrms remaining ﬁxed, no alternative production plan should be able to rally a majority of the shares
against the status quo. As Gevers (1974) already noted, the ﬁrst problem this approach runs into is existence: Plott (1967)
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: herve.cres@sciences-po.fr (H. Crès), mich.tvede@econ.ku.dk (M. Tvede).
1 Tel.: +45 35 32 30 92; fax: +45 35 32 30 85.
2 For details on standard general equilibrium models of production with incomplete markets and the roles of the ﬁrms, see, e.g. Magill and Quinzii (1996)
and the references therein.
3 The choice of a state contingent production plan in a publicly traded corporation is a genuine problemof social choice. This problemhas been profoundly
important in the history of economic thought as Arrow’s impossibility theorem arose out of his effort to ﬁnd mechanisms for solving disagreements in such
cases.
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shows that in multi-dimensional voting models, a simple majority political equilibrium typically does not exist.4 Super
majority rules are a way to ensure existence: to defeat the status quo, a challenger should rally a proportion larger than
50% of the voting population.5 The question of what a ‘suitable’ level a super majority is, arises: it should be high enough to
ensure existence, and low enough not to be too conservative. The standard way to proceed is to associate to each proposal
its (Simpson–Kramer) score. The score of a proposal (the incumbent, or status quo) is the fraction of the voting population
supporting, against this proposal, itsmost dangerous challenger, i.e. the alternative proposal that rallies themaximal fraction
of voters against the incumbent. The most stable proposals are the ones with lowest score, the so-called min–max.
A central questions is: For which rate of super majority is the min–max stable? We illustrate the difﬁculty to answer this
question through the investigation of an economy where consumers/investors have linear–quadratic utility functions. A nice
observation is that the majority voting mechanism is likely to implement equilibria which have the nicest possible welfare
properties one can hope for in an incomplete ﬁnancial market environment. Indeed, looking at the ﬁrst-order conditions of
constrained Pareto optimality, Drèze (1974) argues that proﬁt should be maximized with respect to shadow prices that aver-
age the idiosyncratic shadow prices of all shareholders; hence with respect to the shadow prices of the ‘mean shareholder’.
From Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) we know conditions under which the latter is a proxy to the min–max and is likely to be
stable with respect to a rate of super majority inferior to 64%.
But even there things might not turn that simple. Since the electorate is endogenous, its composition is inﬂuenced
by the agents’ expectations. The classical concept of majority voting equilibrium supposes that shareholders have ‘con-
servative’ expectations: at equilibrium they expect that no challenger can defeat the status quo; therefore they believe
that the status quo production plans are going to prevail in the future; so they stick to their current portfolios. In equilib-
rium, given these current portfolios, conservative expectations are self-fulﬁlling: no challenger can rally a high enough
majority against the status quo. Hence voting equilibria may be viewed as plain Nash equilibria (see Drèze, 1989, pp.
48–49).
But what happens if shareholders deviate from these conservative expectations? If they expect a challenger to defeat the
status quo, they rebalance their portfolios; and it might be the case that, given the new distribution of voting weights/shares,
the challenger rallies a high enough majority against the status quo and the expectations are fulﬁlled.
We expect that an equilibrium which is stable under conservative expectations might not be stable if agents’ expec-
tations deviate. Indeed, suppose a ﬁrm changes its production plan from y to y′, then it changes the dividend matrix
for investors/consumers. Therefore consumers whose investment needs are less covered by y′ than by y might exit – at
least partially – from the capital of the ﬁrm: they will sell shares to consumers whose needs are better covered by y′
than by y. Hence deviating from conservative expectations might enlarge the voting weight of the consumers who are
better off with the challenger y′ and diminishes the voting weight of the consumers who are better off with the status
quo y: this exit effect gives more voting weight in the corporate control mechanism to the shareholders who favor the
challenger over the status quo. Clearly if these deviating expectations are conﬁrmed at equilibrium, then the status quo
is not stable. At equilibrium, deviation from conservative expectations should not be conﬁrmed. We provide a new con-
cept of equilibrium where such deviating expectations are never conﬁrmed at equilibrium: we dub it majority exit-stable
equilibrium.
It is shown that generically a (weakly) higher rate is necessary for the corporate charter to secure that a -majority
equilibrium is exit-stable. A robust example is provided where a strictly higher rate is needed. The extent to which the
corporate charter needs to be increased to secure that a -majority equilibrium is exit-stable depends on the case under
consideration. We provide an example where no 50%-majority equilibrium is exit-stable for any rate of super majority. This
example gives rise to Condorcet cycles between two alternatives, even for rates of super majority very close to unanimity.
Since expectations, whether they are conservative or not, are signiﬁcant for stability of equilibria, it is natural to think of
stability as being inﬂuenced by a ‘political sunspot’. In general, on the one hand conservative expectations should result in
stability because majority equilibria exist for rather low rates of super majority and on the other hand non-conservative
expectations should result in instability perhaps in the form of proxy ﬁghts and hostile takeovers.
The paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Sections 3 and 4 deﬁne the concept of -majority
equilibrium, provides computations and links efﬁciency to stability. Section 5 introduces the concept of exit-stability, and,
through a simple geometric example, it explores the possible occurrence of political sunspots, and of Condorcet cycles of
length two for any rate of super majority.
2. Setup
Consider an economy with 2 dates, t ∈ {0,1}, 1 state at the ﬁrst date s = 0, and S states at the second date s∈ {1, . . . , S}. The
probability distribution over the set of states at date 1 is  = (1, . . . , S) where s > 0. There are: 1 commodity at every
state, a continuum of consumers ∈ where  is the set of characteristics of consumers, and j ﬁrms j∈ {1, . . . , J}.
4 Benninga and Muller (1979) have shown that if production possibility frontiers are unidimensional, then 50% majority voting works. Another condition
ensuring existence of 50% majority equilibria is that the degree of market incompleteness is equal to one, see Crès (2005) and Tvede and Crès (2005).
5 To get existence, Drèze (1985) gives veto power to some shareholders. This result is generalized in Kelsey and Milne (1996) to encompass other voting
rules, such as the generalized median voter rules, a special case of which has been applied to decision theory in ﬁrms by Sadanand and Williamson (1991).
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Consumers are characterized by their initial endowments ω = (ω0,ω1, . . . ,ωS) where ωs ∈R and preference parameters
 > 0. Utility functions are of the linear–quadratic type, so the utility of the consumption bundle x = (x0, x1, . . . , xS) where
xs ∈R of a consumer with preference parameter  is
u (x) = x0 +
S∑
s=1
s
(
xs − 1
2
(xs)2
)
Therefore preferences are of mean–variance type with identical linear risk tolerances. The distribution of consumers is
described by a probability measure on the product of the set of initial endowments and the set of preference parameters
 = (ω,)∈RS+1 × R++. The set of characteristics  is supposed to be endowed with the Borel -algebra. The probability
measure on the set of characteristics is supposed to have compact and convex support  ⊂ RS+1 × R++ and to be described
by a continuous density f :  → R+. Let 	 = (	0,	1, . . . ,	S) where
	 =
∫

ω f ()d
be the mean of initial endowment vectors and let 
 where

 =
∫

 f ()d
be the mean of the preference parameters.
Firms are characterized by their production sets Yj ⊂ RS+1. Production sets are supposed to be convex and the set of
efﬁcient production plans Zj , where Zj is deﬁned by
Zj = {yj ∈Yj|({yj} + RS+1+ ) ∩ Yj = {yj}},
is supposed to be compact. It is assumed that if yj ∈ co Zj for all j, then the dividend matrix
y1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
y11 · · · y1J
...
...
yS1 · · · ySJ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
has rank J.
Consumers have shares in ﬁrms and the distribution of shares is described by an integrable function ı = (ı1, . . . , ıJ) :
 → RJ+ such that∫

ıj() f ()d = 1.
It is of no importancewhether shares are assumed to be non-negative or not. Here shares are assumed to be non-negative.
Let q = (q1, . . . , qJ) be the price vector, then the problem of consumer  is
max(x,) x0 +
S∑
s=1
s
(
xs − 1
2
(xs)2
)
s.t.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x0 − ω0 =
∑
j
qjıj() −
∑
j
(qj − y0j )j
xs − ωs =
∑
j
ysj j for all s ≥ 1.
3. Stock market equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1. A stock market equilibrium (with ﬁxed production plans) is an integrable consumption map, an integrable
portfolio map, a price vector and a list of production plans (q∗, x∗, ∗, y) where x∗ :  → RS+1, ∗ :  → RJ , q∗ ∈RJ and y =
(y1, . . . , yJ) such that:
• consumers maximize utilities, so (x∗(), ∗()) is a solution to the problem of consumer  given y and q∗, and;
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• markets clear, so for all j∈ {1, . . . , J}
∫

x∗() f ()d =
∫

ω f ()d
∫

∗() f ()d =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
...
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
Suppose that (∗, x∗, q∗, y) is a stock market equilibrium, then the ﬁrst-order condition for the problem of consumer  is
Dxu (x∗())
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
y01 − q1 · · · y0J − qJ
y11 · · · y1J
...
...
yS1 · · · ySJ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ = 0.
Therefore let subscript 1 denote the last S coordinates of a vector, let 1S (1J) denote the row-vector with S (J) coordinates
where all coordinates are equal to 1 and let  denote the S × S matrix with  in the diagonal, then as a function of the
characteristics and the portfolio of a consumer the equilibrium price vector is
q∗ = y0 + (1S − ω1 − y1∗())Ty1.
Hence the equilibrium price vector is
q∗ = y0 + (
1S − 	1 − y11J)Ty1.
Thus at a stock market equilibrium, for consumer  the portfolio, the consumption at date 1 and the gradient of consump-
tion at date 1 are
∗T = (y0 − q∗ + (1S − ω1)y1)(yT1y1)
−1
= 1J + (( − 
)1S + (	1 − ω1))y1(yT1y1)
−1
x∗1 = ω1 + ∗TyT1
= ω1 + 1JyT1 + (( − 
)1S + (	1 − ω1))y1(yT1y1)
−1
yT1
Dx1u (x
∗) = (1S − ω1 − 1JyT1)
−(( − 
)1S + (	1 − ω1))y1(yT1y1)
−1
yT1
It is assumed that for all consumers the consumption at date 1 is below the bliss-point, so x∗s1 () <  for all  and s ≥ 1.
4. Majority stable equilibria
The problem of ﬁrm j is more complicated to state than the problem of consumer  because in ﬁrms consumers vote over
production plans. Let (q∗, x∗, ∗, y) be a stock market equilibrium and let y′
j
be a challenger to yj , then consumer  votes for
the challenger if and only if consumer  is better off
u (x∗() + (y′j − yj)∗j ()) > u (x∗()).
Let (x∗, ∗, y, y′
j
) ⊂  be the set of consumers that vote for the challenger. Since the dimension of the set of alternatives
may be higher than one, super-majority rules may be needed to ensure political stability in ﬁrms, so let ∈ [0,1] be the
majority rule. Then at a stock market equilibrium (q∗, x∗, ∗, y) the preferred set of ﬁrm j is deﬁned by
P
j
(x∗, ∗j , yj) =
⎧⎨
⎩y′j ∈Yj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫
(x∗,∗,y,y′
j
)
max{∗
j
(),0} f ()d∫

max{∗
j
(),0} f ()d > 
⎫⎬
⎭ .
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Therefore a challenger production plan is preferred to a status quo production plan if and only if  × 100 percent of
the consumers are better off with the change. The production plan yj is a solution to the problem of ﬁrm j if and only if
P
j
(x∗, ∗
j
, y) = ∅.
Deﬁnition 2. A -majority stable equilibrium is an integrable consumption map, a integrable portfolio map, a price vector
and a list of production plans (q∗, x∗, ∗, y∗) such that:
• (q∗, x∗, ∗, y∗) is a stock market equilibrium, and;
• y∗
j
is a solution to the problem of ﬁrm j so P
j
(x∗, ∗
j
, y∗
j
) = 0.
Since utility functions are quasi-concave, if
u (x∗() + (y′j − yj)∗()) > u (x∗()),
then for all  ∈ [0,1]
u (x∗() + ((1 − )y′j + yj − yj)∗()) > u (x∗()).
Therefore if the distance between the challenger and the status quo decreases, then the fraction of consumers who are
better off with the challenger compared to the status quo increases.
Observation 1. Suppose that (q∗, x∗, ∗, y) is a stock market equilibrium and that Uj is an open neighborhood relative to Yj of
yj , then P

j
(x∗, ∗
j
, yj) ∩ Uj = ∅ if and only if Pj (xj, ∗j , yj) = ∅.
According to the minimal differentiation principle only inﬁnitesimal changes of production plans need to be considered
and for inﬁnitesimal changes ﬁrst-order approximations of utility function can be used to evaluate changes in utility; At a
stock market equilibrium (q∗, x∗, ∗, y) consumer  is better off with a change in direction v of the production plan in ﬁrm j
if and only if there exists  > 0 such that
u (x∗() + v∗j ()) > u (x∗()).
so consumer  is better off with a change in direction v if and only if
Du (x∗())v∗j () > 0.
In a general setup, Tvede and Crès (2005) shows that (S − J)/(S − J + 1) is the lowest rate for which majority stable
equilibria exist where (S − J) is the number of missing markets. The drawback of this result is that in case markets are
very incomplete (i.e. (S − J) is large), one needs a super-majority close to unanimity to ensure existence of equilibria. In the
present parametric setup, a dimension-free rate can be given for existence of stable equilibria. It comes as a straightforward
application of Theorem 1 in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), an application whose possibility is mentioned in Caplin and Nalebuff
(1991) Example 4.2.
Theorem 1 in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) states that, in an n-dimensional subspace, there is no way to cut linearly a
compact and convex support endowed with a -concave distribution through its centroid so that one of the two resulting
pieces is larger than 100 r(n + 1/) percent of the weight.
All ingredients are present to apply Theorem 1 in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991); indeed, at stock market equilibria: (1)
portfolios ∗() depend linearly on characteristics ; (2) the set of characteristics where shares in ﬁrm j are non-negative is
convex; (3) voting weights max{∗
j
(),0} depend linearly on characteristics in the set of characteristics where shares in ﬁrm
j are non-negative, and; (4) gradients Du (x∗()) depend linearly on characteristics .
The dimensionality here is given by the number of parameters in , hence (n =) S + 2. If we restrict our study to the
set of ’s where shares in ﬁrm j are positive (which is, according to the latter point (3), compact and convex) then con-
sumer  is better off with a change in direction v if and only if Du (x∗())v > 0; one therefore sees that the subset of
consumers/parameters  which are better off with a change in direction v is deﬁned (thanks to the latter point 4) as a lin-
ear cutting of a compact convex support through the centroid of the considered distribution; moreover the density of the
distribution of voting weights on vj(y∗) is j(y∗, )f () where j is 1-concave and f is -concave; so according to Lemma 1 in
the appendix the density is /( + 1)-concave. Hence according to Theorem 1 in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)(q∗, (x∗, ∗), y∗)
where q∗ = q(y∗), x∗() = x(y∗, ) and ∗() = (y∗, ) is a -majority equilibrium for  ≥ r(S + 3 + 1/).
Observation 2. Let r : R+ → R+ be deﬁned by
r(a) = 1 −
(
a
a + 1
)a
.
Suppose that f :  → R+ is -concave, so for all ,′ ∈ and  ∈ [0,1]
f ((1 − ) + ′) ≥ (1 − )f () + f (′).
Then for all  ≥ r(S + 3 + 1/) there exist -majority equilibria.
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The proof of the observation is postponed to the appendix. The proof reveals that a stock market equilibria where the
proﬁt of ﬁrm j is maximized with respect to the average gradient of the consumers with positive shares in ﬁrm j exists and
is majority stable. Therefore the production plan for each ﬁrm satisﬁes the Drèze criterion and the Drèze criterion ensures
that the ﬁrst-order conditions of constrained Pareto optimality (for consumers with positive shares) are satisﬁed. This is as
close as we can get to Pareto optimality given the current state of the art. We ﬁnd it remarkable that the Drèze criterion can
be supported by majority voting.
Two important properties of the linear–quadratic utility functions are central for Observation 2: (1) the distribution of
initial shares does not matter because utility functions are linear in consumption at date 0, and; (2) gradients and shares are
linear functions of the parameters.
A sufﬁcient condition for existence of majority stable equilibria for  = 0.5 is that the set of characteristics is one-
dimensional because then themedian voter theoremcanbe applied. (In amulti-dimensional setup it is known that symmetry
conditions on the set of characteristics where shares are non-negative and on distribution of gradients and portfolios are
needed – see Grandmont (1978).) In DeMarzo (1993) two other sufﬁcient conditions for existence for  = 0.5 are provided:
(1) production sets are one-dimensional, or; (2) the number of missing markets S − J is equal to 1 – see also Tvede and Crès
(2005). A simple example that is used in the sequel of the paper is provided.
4.1. A geometric example
There are two states of nature and only one ﬁrm, so S = 2 and J = 1. The probability distribution on the set of states is
symmetric so1 = 2 = 0.5. Consumers have identical utility functions and initial endowments are 0 at date 0, so consumers
only differ with respect to their initial endowments at date 1. Endowments at date 1 are distributed on the line between
a = (−1,1) and b = (1,−1) such that there is no aggregate risk so 	1 = (0,0). The set of efﬁcient production plans Z ⊂ RS is
supposed to be deﬁned by
Z = {y∈R3+|y0 = 1 and ‖(y1, y2)‖ = 1}.
At a stock market equilibrium (q∗, x∗, ∗, y), for consumer  the portfolio is ∗() = 1 − ω1 · y1 so ∗() ≥ 0 for all ω1 on
the line between a and b and y∈ Z , and the consumption at date 1 is x∗1() = ω1 + ∗()y1. Therefore if y2 > y1 (y2 < y1), then
∗() is increasing (decreasing) from a to b and x∗1() is the orthogonal projection of ω1 on the line through y1 othogonal to
z at y1.
For a challenger y′ ∈ Z consumer  is better off with the challenger if and only if u(x∗() + ∗()(y′ − y)) > u(x∗()) or
equivalently
1S · (y′1 − y1) > ω1 · (y′1 − y1).
because x∗1() = ω1 + ∗()y1. Therefore consumers with ω1 below the line (y, y′) deﬁned by (1S − ω1) · (y′ − y) = 0 are
better off with the challenger y′ and consumers with ω1 above the line are better off with the status quo y. The problem is
sketched in a Hotelling-like model in Fig. 1 below.
As the challenger y′ moves towards the status quo y, the line (y, y′) turns clockwise around 1S . Hence if the distance
between the challenger and the status quo decreases, then the fraction of consumers who are better off with the challenger
compared to the status quo increases as stated in Observation 1 on the minimal differentiation principle. Clearly if the
Fig. 1. The status quo y vs. the challenger y′ .
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distribution of consumers on the line from a to b is symmetric, then y∗ where y2∗ = y1∗ is a -majority stable equilibrium for
 = 0.5, as the distribution of shares is uniformly distributed on the line from a to b so ∗() = 1 for all . Moreover at the
-majority stable equilibrium where y2∗ = y1∗ the median voter is the Drèze mean shareholder. Obviously for all y∈ Z such
that y1, y2 > 0, there exists a symmetric distribution of consumers such that y is a -majority stable equilibrium for  = 0.5.
5. ‘Exit’ expectations
At majority stable equilibria as in the standard equilibrium concepts of the literature consumers are supposed to have
conservative expectations in the sense that they expect status quo production plans to be stable. Therefore consumers expect
that no challenger is able to defeat status quo. In equilibrium these conservative expectations are conﬁrmed: no challenger
defeats status quo. But what happens if consumers deviate from conservative expectations?
For a list of status quo production plans y = (y1, . . . , yJ) suppose that consumers expect the challenger y′j to defeat the
status quo yj in a proxy ﬁght in ﬁrm j. Then all consumers should trade as if the production plan of ﬁrm j is y′j rather than
yj . Hence if (q′, x′, ′, y′) where y′ = (y1, . . . , yj−1, y′j, yj+1, . . . , yJ), is a stock market equilibrium, then the outcome should be
(q′, x˜, ′, y) where x˜ :  → RS+1 is deﬁned by⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x˜0() = ω0 +
∑
j
ıj()q
′
j −
∑
j
j()(q
′
j − y0j )
x˜s() = ωs +
∑
j
j()y
s
j for all s ≥ 1
so prices and portfolios adjust to expectations: the challenger y′
j
defeats the status quo yj . Hence the change of production
plan from yj to y′j should turn the outcome into a stock market equilibrium.
Clearly the change from the status quo yj to the challenger y′j changes the dividend matrix, so y
′
j
compared to yj offers new
insurance opportunities. Thus consumers whose insurance needs are less (more) covered by y′
j
than by yj will exit (enter) –
at least partially – from the capital of the ﬁrm. Hence consumers whose needs are less covered by y′
j
than by yj sell shares to
consumerswhose needs aremore covered by y′
j
than by yj . Thus exit expectations enlarge the votingweight of the consumers
who are better off with the challenger y′
j
and diminish the voting weight of the consumers who are better off with yj . Clearly
if exit expectations are conﬁrmed at equilibrium, then the status quo is not stable. At equilibrium, exit expectations should
not be conﬁrmed. Therefore another equilibrium concept is proposed.
Deﬁnition 3. A -majority exit-stable equilibrium is an integrable consumption map, an integrable portfolio map, a price
vector and a list of production plans (q∗, x∗, ∗, y∗) such that:
• (q∗, x∗, ∗, y∗) is a stock market equilibrium, and;
• if (q, x, , (y∗−j, yj)) is a stock market equilibrium and x˜ :  → RS+1 is deﬁned by
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x˜0() = ω0 +
∑
k
ık()qk −
∑
k
k()(qk − y∗0k )
x˜s() = ωs +
∑
k
k()y
∗s
k for all s ≥ 1
then P
k
(x˜, , y∗
k
) = ∅.
It should be expected that a -majority exit-stable equilibrium is a -majority stable equilibrium as shown – at least
partially – in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let (q∗, x∗, ∗, y∗) be a -majority exit-stable equilibrium and suppose that for all (yn)n∈N there exists
(qn, xn, n)n∈N such that (qn, xn, n, yn) is a stockmarket equilibrium and if yn → y∗, then (xn, n, qn) → (x∗, ∗, q∗) in the sup-
norm. Then (q∗, x∗, ∗, y∗) is a -majority stable equilibrium.
The proof of the proposition is postponed to the appendix.
5.1. A geometric example – continued
Consider the -majority stable equilibrium (q∗, x∗, ∗, y∗) where  = 0.5 and y2∗ = y1∗ exhibited at the end of Section 4.
Suppose exit expectations occur. There are two effects working in opposite direction when measuring the support of the
challenger against the status quo. The ﬁrst effect is the Hotelling effect depicted on Fig. 1: the closer the challenger is to the
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status quo, the more consumers are better off with the challenger. Hence a classical centripetal force inﬂuences the position
of the challenger (at the source of the minimum differentiation principal in the conservative expectations regime).
But there is another effect which rests on the fact that, under the exit expectations regime, the distribution of voting
shares changes with the position of the challenger; one then has the exit effect: the further away the challenger is from the
status quo, the more shares do consumers, who are better off with the challenger, have. Hence a centrifugal force inﬂuences
the position of the challenger. Whether the Hotelling effect or the exit effect dominates depends on the parameters of the
model.
We are now presenting examples of distributions where the exit effect dominates the Hotelling effect. In these examples
the median voter disappears. It can even be the case that in this one-dimensional problem, no equilibria exists for rates of
super-majority strictly smaller than unanimity.
Let endowment at date 1 be parameterized by  ∈ [−1,1] such that at date 1 the endowment of consumer  is  in state 1
and − in state 2. Let efﬁcient production plans be parameterized by v∈ [0,1] such that at date 1 the production of the ﬁrm
is v in state 1 and
√
1 − v2 in state 2. Suppose that  = 1.
Suppose that consumers are uniformly distributed on the line between a = (−1,1) and b = (1,−1). For y∗ where
y2∗ = y1∗ = 1/
√
2 under conservative expectations, portfolios are uniformly distributed and consumers with less (more)
endowment in state 1 than in state 2 are better off with a change of production plan to a production plan with more (less)
output in state 1 and less in state 2. Therefore y is stable for the majority rule  = 0.5. For y where y1 = y2 = 1/
√
2 under exit
expectations where consumers expect z with z1 = v and z2 =
√
1 − v2, the portfolio of consumer  is 1 − (v −
√
1 − v2) and
consumer  is better off with a change of production plan from y to z if and only if
 <
v +
√
1 − v2 −
√
2
v −
√
1 − v2
for v∈
[
1/
√
2,1
]
. Hence the voting weight of the consumers who are better off with z, where z1 = v, z2 =
√
1 − v2 and
v∈
[
1/
√
2,1
]
, than with y is
∫ v +√1 − v2 − √2
v −
√
1 − v2
−1
1
2
(1 − (v −
√
1 − v2)) d = 1
2
(2v −
√
2)(1 −
√
1 − v2) +
√
2v − 1
v −
√
1 − v2
The relation between v and the voting weight of the consumers who are better off with z than with y is shown in Fig. 1
where it is seen that y is exit-stable for themajority rule ≈ 0.53. Thus in order to ensure exit stability themajority rule has to
be increased from 0.5 to approximately 0.53. But with 0.53 as majority rule only conservative expectations are self-fulﬁlling
and quite paradoxically no challenger is supported by more than 50 % of the shares against the status quo so the rate of super
majority is not reached (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Rate of super-majority.
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Clearly for any distribution of endowments there exists a  such that the Hotelling effect dominates the exit effect. Indeed
the exit effect depends on  and  does not depend on  because  = 1 − ω1 · y1 and the Hotelling effect increases with  .
Hence as  tends to inﬁnity the rate of super majority needed to ensure exit-stability converges to 0.5. However if the exit
effect dominates as in Fig. 1, then the minimal differentiation principle does not apply to consumers with exit expectations.
Suppose that the distribution of consumers on the line between a and b is described by a density f˛ : [−1,1] → R+, where
˛ ≥ 0, deﬁned by
f˛() =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
˛(−)2˛ + 1
2(˛ + 1) for  ∈ [−1,0]
˛()2˛ + 1
2(˛ + 1) for  ∈ [0,1]
Then the mass of consumers is one for all ˛. Moreover it is the uniform distribution for ˛ = 0 and it converges to the dis-
tribution where all the mass is equally split between a and b as ˛ tends to ∞. For a production plan y where y1 = v and y2 =√
1 − v2 and v∈ [1/
√
2,1], under conservative expectations the votingweight of the consumerswho are better offwith a pro-
ductionplanwith amarginally larger production than v state 1 and amarginally smaller production than
√
1 − v2 in state 2 is
W˛(v) =
∫ √1 − v2 − v√
1 − v2 + v
−1
(1 − (v −
√
1 − v2))
(
˛(−)2˛ + 1
2(˛ + 1)
)
d
= 1
2(˛ + 1)
(
1 +
√
1 − v2 − v√
1 − v2 + v
)
+ v −
√
1 − v2
4(˛ + 1)
⎛
⎝1 −
(√
1 − v2 − v√
1 − v2 + v
)2⎞⎠
+ ˛
2˛ + 1
⎛
⎝1 −
(
−
√
1 − v2 − v√
1 − v2 + v
)2˛+1⎞⎠
+˛(v −
√
1 − v2)
2(˛ + 1)
⎛
⎝1 −
(
−
√
1 − v2 − v√
1 − v2 + v
)2(˛+1)⎞⎠ .
Clearly W˛ : [1/
√
2,1] → [0,1] is continuous, W˛(1/
√
2) = 0.5 and W˛(1) = 0 and lim˛→∞W˛(v) = 1/2 + (v −√
1 − v2)/2 > 0.5 for all v∈ [1/
√
2,1]. Therefore thereexists a sequence (˛n, vn)n∈N,where limn→∞˛n = ∞and limn→∞vn = 1
with vn ∈ [1/
√
2,1] for all n, such that W˛n (vn) = 0.5 for all n. Hence under conservative expectations vn and by symmetry√
1 − v2n are stable for  = 0.5 for the distribution f˛n .
Under exit expectations, suppose that
√
1 − v2 where v∈ [1/
√
2,1], is the status quo and that v is the challenger so
consumers expect v todefeat
√
1 − v2, then thevotingweightof the consumerswhoarebetter offwith v thanwith
√
1 − v2 is
We˛(v) =
∫ 0
−1
(1 − (v −
√
1 − v2))
(
˛(−)2˛ + 1
2(˛ + 1)
)
d
= 1
2(˛ + 1) +
v −
√
1 − v2
4(˛ + 1) +
˛
2˛ + 1 +
˛(v −
√
1 − v2)
2(˛ + 1)
Therefore limn→∞We˛n (vn) = 1 because limn→∞vn = 1. Hence for all  < 1 there exists n that vn and
√
1 − v2n is a 2-cycle
in the sense that if
√
1 − v2n resp. vn is the status quo, but consumers expect the challenger vn resp.
√
1 − v2n to defeat the
status quo, then the majority for challenger is larger than .
Under exit expectations, for every ∈ [0,1], there exist ¯˛ , ε > 0, such that for ˛ > ¯˛ : (1) if v∈ [0, ε] ∪ [1 − ε,1], then the
voting weight of the consumers who are better off with
√
1 − v2 is larger than , and; (2) if v∈ [ε,1 − ε], then the voting
weight of the consumers who are better off with either 0 or 1 is larger than . Therefore for every ∈ [0,1] there exists N ∈N
such that if n ≥ N, then no production plan is exit stable.
Under conservative expectations, there exist stable production plans for the simple majority rule. Under exit expectations
for all super-majority rules there exist distributions of consumers such that: no production plan is exit-stable, and; there
exist 2-cycles of stable production plans (v and
√
1 − v2 are stable under conservative expectations and if consumers expect
v to defeat
√
1 − v2, then v defeats
√
1 − v2 and if consumers expect
√
1 − v2 to defeat v, then
√
1 − v2 defeats v).
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6. Final remarks
For conservative expectations we have shown in our setup that if shares are traded before production plans are decided
as in Drèze (1974), then the initial distribution of shares is without importance for stability. However if shares are traded
after production plans are decided as in Grossman and Hart (1979), then the initial distribution of shares matter. Indeed in
order to apply Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) the initial distribution of shares has to be assumed to be -concave. Therefore, in
our setup, markets have an important role in smoothing shares.
For exit expectations we have shown in our setup that if shares are traded before production plans are decided, then
markets may be destabilizing in the sense that stability cannot be ensured because the challenger is expected to defeat the
status quo. If share are traded after production plans are decided, then expectations are without importance. Therefore there
seems to be a tradeoff between on the one hand the smoothing effect of markets and on the other hand the destabilizing
effect of markets.
Acknowledgments
Hervé Crès would like to thank the Fondation HEC for ﬁnancial support. Mich Tvede would like to thank the Danish
Research Councils.
Appendix A
The product of a ˛-concave and a ˇ-concave distribution
Lemma 1. If G : K → R+ is ˛-concave and H : K → R+ is ˇ-concave. Then F : K → R+ deﬁned by F(a) = G(a)H(a) for all a∈K
is -concave for all
 ≤ ˛ˇ
˛ + ˇ .
Proof. It follows from the deﬁnition of -concavity that if
(((1 − t)G(a)˛ + tG(b)˛)1/˛((1 − t)H(a)ˇ + tH(b)ˇ)1/ˇ)

≥ (1 − t)(G(a)H(a)) + t(G(b)H(b))
for all a, b∈K and t ∈ [0,1] then F : K → R+ is -concave.
Let g, h : [0,1] → R+ be deﬁned by
g(t) = ((1 − t)G(a)˛ + tG(b)˛)1/˛
h(t) = ((1 − t)H(a)ˇ + tH(b)ˇ)1/ˇ
then g is ˛-concave and h is ˇ-concave. Let f : [0,1] → R+ be deﬁned by f (t) = (g(t)h(t)) then the second-order derivative
is
D2f = (gh)−2(( − 1)(gDf )2 + (fDg)2 + 2(gDf )(fDg) + fg(gD2f + fD2g))
≤ (gh)−2(( − ˛)(gDf )2 + 2(gDf )(fDg) + ( − ˇ)(fDg)2).
The “≤” follows from the fact that g being ˛-concave is equivalent to g˛ being concave so D2g˛ = ˛g˛−2((˛ − 1)(Dg)2 +
gD2g) ≤ 0 implying gD2g ≤ (1 − ˛)(Dg)2 – similarly for h and ˇ.
Finally ( − ˛)(gDf )2 + 2(gDf )(fDg) + ( − ˇ)(fDg)2 ≤ 0 for all values of gDf and fDg if and only if  ≤ ˛ˇ/(˛ + ˇ). Hence,
F : K → R+ is -concave for all  ≤ ˛ˇ/(˛ + ˇ). 
Proof of Observation 2. Let the maps q : co Z → RJ ,  : co Z ×  → RJ and x : co Z ×  → RS+1 be deﬁned by
q(y) = y0 + (
1S − 	1 − y11J)Ty1
(y,) = (y0 − q∗ + (1S − ω1)y1)(yT1y1)
−1
= 1J + (( − 
)1S + (	1 − ω1))y1(yT1y1)
−1
x(y,) = (ω0 + q(y)ı() − (q(y) − y0)(y,),ω1 + (y,)yT1)
Then all maps are continuous and  and x are linear in characteristics.
Let the correspondences v1, . . . , vJ : co Z →  be deﬁned by
vj(y) = {|j(y,) ≥ 0}.
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Then all correspondences are continuous and convex valued.
Let the maps 1, . . . , J : co Z → RS+1 be deﬁned by
j(y) =
∫
vj(y)
Du (x(y,)) j(y,)f ()d.
Then all maps are continuous.
Let the correspondences pj : co Z → co Zj be deﬁned by
pj(y) = {y′j|∀z′j ∈ co Zj : j(y)z′j ≤ j(y)yj}.
Then all correspondences are upper hemi-continuous. Therefore according to Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem there exists y∗
such that y∗
j
∈pj(y∗) for all j and y∗j ∈ Zj because by assumption Du (x(y,))∈RS+1++ for all . 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (q∗, x∗, ∗, y∗) be a -majority exit-stable equilibrium and suppose that for all (yn)n∈N there
exists (qn, xn, n)n∈N such that (qn, xn, n, yn) is a stockmarket equilibrium and if yn → y∗, then (xn, n, qn) → (x∗, ∗, q∗) in
the sup-norm. Therefore if (1/‖yn
j
− y∗
j
‖)(yn
j
− y∗
j
) → vj and ∗()Du (x∗()) · vj > 0, then there exists n such that if n ≥ N, then
u (xn() + j()(ynj − y∗j )) > u (xn()), because (qn, xn, n) → (q∗, x∗, ∗) in the sup-norm and because the utility function is
continuous. Hence if a -majority exit-stable equilibrium, then it is a -majority stable equilibrium. 
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